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Using Demonstration Experiments to Illustrate 
the Pitfalls of Unintentional Moral Relativism
INTRODUCT ION
When Christian students of business ethics are con-
fronted with the idea that their judgment can be prone to
relativistic sway, they often bristle with indignant denial.
After all, they believe in moral absolutes, and they look to
biblical principles to provide their ethical standards and
inform their decisions. They wear WWJD bracelets and
sincerely intend to apply the Ten Commandments and
Golden Rule uniformly across situations to make ethical
evaluations and decisions – in business as in life.
Unfortunately, good intent – even firm commitment –
is not sufficient to protect one from the pitfalls of relativis-
tic judgment and consequent bad decisions/behaviors.
Consider the case of “pre-Cana” (prenuptial) counseling.
Imagine if pastors were to ask engaged couples if they
intend to cheat on their future spouse. What proportion
do you suppose would express an intention to be unfaith-
ful? (Answer: zero! They are in love!) And so the rate of
infidelity and divorce should be zero, right? But, sadly, it is
not, even within Christian communities. External circum-
stances, as well as our sinful nature, can interfere with good
intentions and skew judgment, leading to bad decisions
and regrettable outcomes. To avoid being trapped in the
snare of temptation, one must not only disavow evil and
embrace good, but also fully understand the dark circum-
stances under which one can be led astray.
By analogy, the intent to remain faithful to one’s
beliefs in moral absolutes is not sufficient to protect one
from the snare of poor judgment in business. Just as a
magnet can pull a compass needle away from true north,
one’s “moral compass” can be pulled off course by the pow-
erful sway of circumstances. Imagine a yardstick made of a
temperature-sensitive material. We assume it to be an
objective measure of 36 inches, and it will always appear to
be graduated in 36 one-inch units. However, when exposed
to cold it will contract to less than 36 inches. When
exposed to heat it will expand to more than 36 inches.
Woe to the carpenter or seamstress who trusts such a meas-
ure! The classroom demonstration experiments that follow
illustrate circumstances that can distort the application of
ethical yardsticks typically applied by Christian students in
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the context of business ethics. This variable yardstick/stray
compass phenomenon has been called “unintentional
moral relativism” (UMR), a term that can be traced to a
Journal of Business Ethics article by Boyle, Dahlstrom, and
Kellaris (1998). UMR can be caused by any number of cir-
cumstantial judgment biases, as illustrated in the following
experiments. 
DEMONSTRAT ION  1 :  THE  CONTRAST  E F FECT
One source of UMR is a judgmental bias known as
the “contrast effect.” According to adaptation level theory
(Helson 1948, 1959), a contrast effect occurs when expo-
sure to a prior event establishes a frame of reference used
to judge a current event. For example, the same “room
temperature” living room may seem cool to someone arriv-
ing from a hot kitchen, but warm to someone arriving
from the cold outdoors. The same “event” (i.e., room tem-
perature) is judged differently according to the frame of
reference established by exposure to prior circumstances.
By analogy, despite one’s intention to apply an
absolute standard, ethical judgments can differ according
to frames of reference established by prior circumstances
(Boyle et al., 1998). Imagine an experiment in which the
central task is to rate the ethics of a controversial business
practice on a ten-point ethical/unethical scale. The contro-
versial practice is something that many students would rec-
ognize as being in the mid-scale “gray area” of ethics. (It is
legal, but you would not be proud to tell your mother and
pastor you did it.) Although instructors may wish to devise
their own example of a gray-area practice, and are strongly
encouraged to do so, here is an example used by Kleiser et
al. (2003), working with students at a state university:
Salesperson M, who works for the XYZ company, fre-
quently invites his customers to baseball games to show his
appreciation for their business. The XYZ company encour-
ages “gift giving” as long as the client’s company does not
have a policy prohibiting such behavior, but forbids gift-
giving when the client’s company does not allow it. One of
M's customers works for such a company where gifts, like
dinner or a ball game, may not be accepted. Salesperson M
is aware of this policy. 
Over the past few weeks, this customer has been less
than pleased with XYZ company. During the close of a
recent sales call, the customer said to M, “I understand
XYZ has season tickets to the baseball games. Is there any
possibility that we could catch a game?” Believing that
going to the game would secure future sales, M invited the
customer to the ball game. Three days later, the customer
placed a major order with XYZ company.
Prior to rating the practice on an ethics scale
(Dabholkar & Kellaris, 1998), half of the class is asked to
read a brief newspaper report about a recent homicide (or
some other exemplar of extremely unethical behavior). The
other half is asked to read a brief account of the life of
Mother Teresa (or some other exemplar of good behavior).
The two readings should be of similar length and assign-
ment of students to readings should be random.
Optionally, some students can be assigned to a control
group that sees just the scenario, with no priming material.
Rating of the controversial business practice should follow
immediately after the reading:
Please indicate your opinion of salesman M’s actions as
described in the preceding scenario by circling an appropri-
ate number on each of the following scales.
In my opinion, his actions were:
Ethical  10   9   8   7  6  5  4  3  2  1  Unethical
If the instructor tabulates the average ethical rating for
each group – those primed with a negative exemplar of
behavior and those primed with a positive exemplar — it is
likely you will find that the very same controversial busi-
ness practice seems more ethical to the “homicide group”
and less ethical to the “Mother Teresa group.” Voila —
UMR. This is what Boyle et al. (1998) and Kellaris et al.
(1996) found, and it is consistent with the author’s experi-
ence using this demo in his classroom. If we apply an
absolute standard consistently, we should always arrive at
the same judgment. But, as this experiment demonstrates,
judgment can be skewed circumstantially by inadvertently
adopted frames of references. A variation on this experi-
ment would be to ask students if they would hire the sales-
man in the scenario rather than rating his actions on an
ethics scale (Sivadas et al., 2003). Follow-up discussion
could focus on identifying and adopting appropriate
frames of reference, as well as potential consequences of
adopting inappropriate frames of reference. Once the prin-
ciple of UMR is understood, the instructor can challenge
students to generate and critique frames of reference, as
well as to identify inappropriate reference points and their
potential pitfalls for Christians.
DEMONSTRAT ION  2 :  THE  FRAMING  EFFECT
Another source of judgmental bias that can lead to UMR
is the “framing effect” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The
framing effect occurs when a choice option is described (or
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“framed”) in a way that makes it seem subjectively more
attractive. Despite being objectively the same quantity, a
glass described as “half full” may seem more attractive than
a glass described as “half empty.” That is because whereas
one description emphasizes what one stands to gain, the
other calls attention to what one stands to miss. Naturally,
people are attracted to gains and averse to loss. Research by
Kellaris et al. (1994) shows that the framing effect is suffi-
ciently strong to lure the unwary into favoring the less eth-
ical of two choice options.
Here is an adaptation of a classic demonstration of the
framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) as applied to
a choice with ethical content. All students should be pre-
sented with the following scenario:
Imagine that you are the CEO of a large company.
You just found out that a major competitor will be enter-
ing your market. Reliable forecasts estimate that to remain
profitable, you may have to lay off 6,000 employees. You
must choose a plan to deal with this situation. You have
narrowed your choices down to two alternatives. (Assume
that the forecast and the estimated consequences of the
alternative plans are accurate.)
Students should be assigned randomly to one of two
groups. Group 1 should see this version of the choice deci-
sion:
PLAN A: This plan is somewhat controversial. It
stretches the limits of legality, but if it is adopted, 2,000
employees can definitely be retained.
PLAN B: If this plan is adopted, there is a 1/3 proba-
bility that all 6,000 employees can be retained, and a 2/3
probability that no employees can be retained.
Group 2 should see this version of the choice decision:
PLAN A: If this plan is adopted, 4,000 employees will
definitely lose their jobs.
PLAN B: This plan is somewhat controversial. It
stretches the limits of legality, but if it is adopted there is a
1/3 probability that no employees will lose their jobs, and
a 2/3 probability that all 6,000 employees will lose their
jobs.
In terms of expected utility, the choice options are
objectively the same within versions (2,000 jobs saved =
1/3 * 6,000 jobs saved) and between versions (2,000
retained = 4,000 lost). Prospect theory predicts that people
will prefer certain gains over probabilistic gains, but proba-
bilistic losses over certain losses. Hence, despite the objec-
tive equivalence of the plans, the expectation is that people
given the choice decision framed in terms of gains (first
version) should prefer Plan A; those given the choice deci-
sion framed in terms of loss (second version) should prefer
Plan B. The twist here is that the plans framed more favor-
ably are also the more ethically controversial! Will any stu-
dents fall for the framing effect even when the more attrac-
tively framed option is less ethical? A simple cross-tabula-
tion of “version” (gains/losses) by “choice” (plan A/B) will
reveal the answer. In a similar experiment, Kellaris et al.
(1994) found that as many as half of the sales professionals
they surveyed preferred the less ethical option when it was
framed attractively. A recent administration of this demo
experiment at a Christian University found that 5 of 23
students in Group 1 preferred Plan A and 10 of 23 stu-
dents in Group 2 preferred Plan B, despite these choices
being ethically controversial.  
DEMONSTRAT ION  3 :  THE  NUMEROS ITY  B IAS
Yet a third source of UMR-causing bias stems from the
tendency to use decision heuristics — mental shortcuts —
to simplify decision tasks. The use of heuristics is more
likely when one is under time pressure to come to a quick
decision or when the complexity of a decision taxes cogni-
tive resources and thus motivates shortcuts. One common
heuristic on which people rely is to count the number of
items presented rather than evaluating content on its
merit. This is known as the “numerosity effect” (Pelham et
al., 1994). When the “items” are reasons to do or not do
something, one might find multiple “lame” (weak) reasons
to be more compelling than a few sound, strong reasons
due to their mere number. Sweeney and Kellaris (2008)
found that ethical ratings of a controversial act were lower
among people presented with 12 (versus three) reasons not
to do the act, despite the 12 reasons being somewhat
superficial. Conversely, ethical ratings of the same act were
higher among people presented with 12 (versus three) rea-
sons to do the act.
To illustrate the numerosity bias to students, ask them
to read a controversial (mid-scale) business practice as in
Demonstration 1 above. Before asking for ethical ratings,
present half of the students with three reasons to do what
the actor in the scenario did. Building on the Kleiser et al.
scenario cited above, Sweeney and Kellaris (2008) present-
ed this list: “1. This is a perfectly legal, well-accepted rela-
tionship-building technique. 2. The customer asked to be
taken to the game. 3. There were no negative conse-
quences.” Present the other half of students with the same
list, continuing with: “4. In fact, there were positive conse-
quences. 5. Salesman M was just doing his job. 6. It’s just a
ball game, not an expensive gift. 7. Everyone does this. 8.
Refusal could have damaged the relationship. 9. It was not
a tangible gift, such as money or a TV set. 10. Salesman M
did not make the initial overture. 11. XYZ bought those
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season tickets for a reason. 12. The tickets might have gone
unused and been wasted.” (Taken from Sweeney &
Kellaris, 2008.) Optionally, some students can be assigned
to a control group that sees the just scenario, without the
list of justifications.
The expected result is that those given 12 justifica-
tions for performing the act described in the scenario will
rate the act as more ethical; those given only three justifi-
cations will rate the act as less ethical. This is, in fact,
what Sweeney and Kellaris (2008) observed. However, in
one administration of this demo at a Christian University,
the reverse effect was obtained. Reading 12 justifications
made students suspicious (“me thinks thou doest protest
too much”) and more critical. Nevertheless, the point is
that if students apply an absolute standard, judgment
should not be swayed in either direction by reading a list
of justifications.
A variation of this experiment would be to generate
lists of three and 12 reasons not to do the act described in
the scenario, in which case the expected results (those
obtained by S & K) would be a lower average ethical rating
for the group exposed to the longer list. If Christian stu-
dents were not prone to this judgmental bias, one would
expect the means of both groups to be identical (or statisti-
cally similar). Moreover they should not differ from a con-
trol group who saw and rated the scenario without seeing
three or 12 justifications.
A  FEW PRACT ICAL  T IPS . . .
In smaller classes, results of a demonstration experi-
ment can be tabulated instantly by asking students to (1)
complete the exercise, (2) identify which group they are in,
then (3) shout out the number they circled
(Demonstration 1 and 3) or which plan they chose
(Demonstration 2). The instructor can record results and
tabulate them by hand or assign one student to be the class
“statistician.” In large classes the instructor can collect stu-
dents’ responses, enter them in a spreadsheet or analytic
program such as SPSS or SAS, and report the results at the
next class meeting.
These demonstration experiments have produced the
expected pattern of results reliably over multiple iterations.
Nevertheless, sometimes the results of an experiment are
obfuscated by the responses of outliers. In experiments
involving ethical ratings, some students may refuse to
make any distinction between slightly and extremely
unethical acts. Premeditated murder is wrong and “bor-
rowing” a paperclip from an office without permission or
replacement is also wrong; hence, both acts may be rated
as a one on the 10-point ethical(10)/unethical(1) scale by
some individuals. Should that occur in your demonstra-
tion, consider excluding such outlier responses from the
calculation of the group average. This is justifiable on the
grounds that means are highly sensitive to outlying obser-
vations, outlier responses are atypical and hence not repre-
sentative of the majority, and may reflect a misunderstand-
ing of or refusal to perform the experimental task which
calls for use of the 10-point scale (not just its endpoints).
Another hazard to watch out for is that the heuristic
bias in Demonstration 3 can melt away or even reverse
direction with ample critical thinking. In one case, stu-
dents at a Christian university who were exposed to lists
of three or 12 positive justifications found themselves dis-
agreeing with the justifications. Whereas the longer list
had potential to generate more disagreement, students
exposed to 12 positive justifications produced lower aver-
age ethical ratings than students exposed to three positive
justifications. On the surface, this appears to be a failed
experiment. However, the lesson here is still valid: if the
application of absolute, Christian ethical principles is con-
sistent across circumstances, the various groups in the
experiment should have produced statistically similar
results. In fact they did not. Results vary across lists
whether the lists provoke agreement or disagreement with
the justifications presented.
If class size is very small, an alternative to conducting
the above demonstrations in class would be to assign stu-
dents to collect data from fellow students and share results
in class. This could be done in other, larger classes either
during class time (with prior consent), or as students
enter/exit a class. Alternatively data could be collected in a
dormitory, dining hall, at a chapel, or other convocation.
CONCLUS ION
Like drivers who believe that traffic laws apply to all
the other motorists on the road, students often seem to
believe that judgmental bias is a problem to which the eth-
ical decisions of others are prone. The demonstration
experiments offered here are designed to illustrate that (1)
human judgment is prone to subjective, circumstantial
bias, (2) whereas Christians are equipped with human
brains, our ethical judgment is not immune to such biases,
and (3) despite sincere intent to apply moral absolutes
when making ethical judgments, our subjective judgment
can be swayed circumstantially by reference points, frames,
reliance on heuristics, and other sources of bias.
The good news is that being aware of sources of bias
can mitigate their deleterious effects on judgment. UMR is
CBAR Spring 2010
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a fragile enemy that runs from minds fully engaged and
armed with information. As Christian business educators,
it would seem imperative that we “arm” our students with
this information in a way that convinces them of its value
and motivates them to take it to heart. In my experience,
preaching in the classroom has limited impact. A single,
dramatic demonstration experiment, by contrast, can be a
highly effective way of getting an important message
through. The author has found that self-generated evidence
is a powerful teaching tool for chipping away at the natural
resistance of a youthfully over-confident, “surely not I,
Lord” mentality.
Some additional points of discussion might include
questioning from a Christian perspective the very idea of
ethical “gray areas” and scalar ratings represented in these
exercises. One might also question the idea of making ethi-
cal judgments on the basis of outcomes (“consequential-
ism”), as in Demonstration 2. Christian ethics, rooted in
scriptural injunction, is in essence deontological (Hunt &
Vitell, 1986). Ends do not justify means when the means
are per se unethical. Are there other subtle examples of
importation of values (Jung & Kellaris, 2001) underlying
the experiments? Students can be challenged to address this
question to foster critical thinking and to map the signifi-
cance of the experiments onto a Christian ethical frame-
work. Yet another direction for discussion would be the
roles of individual and cultural differences in shaping ethi-
cal responses (Jung & Kellaris, 2004). 
Although these demonstration experiments are intend-
ed for use in business ethics classes, they could also be used
in any introductory business class (e.g., marketing or man-
agement), in a business statistics class, or in a marketing
research class as a methodological illustration with ethical
implications, or in a psychology or consumer behavior
class to illustrate psychological principles with ethical
implications.
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